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THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DE-
MOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION. By Jen-
nifer L. Hochschild.I New Haven: Yale University Press. 
1984. Pp. xvi, 263. Paper, $8.95. 
Aaron Wildavsky2 
But some see racism as anomalous: the dilemma of Americans is our continued 
weakness in ... weeding out our shame so that our true creed may flourish. Once 
we bring ourselves to pull the weeds, American idealism will bloom all the better. 
Others see racism as symbiotic: the American garden is rooted in and nurtured by 
blacks' second-class status. To eradicate it, we must be willing and able to change 
the whole shape and ecology of the American landscape. Only then can the Ameri-
can creed blossom. 
Anomaly theorists argue ... that a garden can be rejuvenated by pulling one 
weed at a time. Symbiosis theorists argue that it cannot-if the soil and layout of a 
garden are unsuited to their intended crops, pulling a few weeds does no good and 
actually does harm by deluding us into false perceptions of progress. 
Anomaly theorists argue ... that all Americans ... would prefer a garden 
blooming with racial equity to one choking in the weeds of discrimination. Symbio-
sis theorists argue that we do not-that whites (and perhaps some blacks) benefit 
from a landscape that includes racial discrimination and wiii resist the bulldozing 
needed to reshape it. 3 
* * * 
We have no right to look upon future citizens as if we were master gardeners 
who can tell the difference between a pernicious weed and a beautiful flower.4 
In her tough-minded, trenchant marshalling of evidence, Jen-
nifer Hochschild argues that since racial desegregation and political 
democracy are at odds, representativeness should give way to re-
sults, equal rights to equal outcomes. Though Americans claim 
they oppose racial segregation in schools, she contends, in fact we 
are unwilling to adopt the necessary remedies. She claims further, 
that incremental change actually makes things worse for white and 
black alike. Hochschild recommends "bulldozing"-a quick, com-
prehensive, and coercive policy drawing in all children in entire 
I. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Princeton University. 
2. Professor, Political Science Department, Graduate School of Public Policy, and 
Survey Research Center, University of California. I wish to thank John Ogbu and Paul 
Sniderman for most helpful discussions. 
3. J. HOCHSCHILD, supra, at 8-10. 
4. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A LIBERAL STATE 139 (1980). 
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metropolitan areas. Her analysis and her proposal are procrustean: 
the policy fits all circumstances and all sizes of student populations. 
This is a bravura performance, relentless and compelling. But is it 
wise? 
Just as pollution is defined as misplaced dirt, so the practical 
definition of a weed is a flower in the wrong place. If everything has 
to be changed ("the whole shape and ecology of the American land-
scape") to change anything ("one weed at a time"), it is no wonder 
that Hochschild fears for progress. Where she spies foul weeds pa-
rading as fragrant flowers (are we now and have we ever been be-
lievers in the liberal creed?), I detect a confusion of classification. 
Where she suggests a Rousseauian vision within which the Ameri-
can creed might blossom, I see Robespierre weeding out 
undesirables. 
Portraying herself as "a child of the 1960s" who shares "its 
mistrust of and distaste for cautious middle-class-oriented change in 
the face of serious, even desperate, problems,"s Hochschild begins 
by contrasting racism and liberalism. Under liberalism, she writes, 
"All citizens have an equal right to express their political wishes 
and equal opportunity to act politically." By racism, however, she 
does "not mean personal dislike or denigration of another race or 
ethnic group" but rather "institutional racism," whether or not 
intended.6 
Although, generally, Hochschild is commendably candid, her 
definition of equal opportunity turns out to be one of equal results. 
For her, racism is any pattern of actions that result in different ra-
cial outcomes-"actions," as she says, "that usually elevate whites 
and subordinate blacks. "7 If the measure of equal outcomes is used, 
of course, then the game is over before it starts, because we all 
know, without inquiring about equality of opportunity, that out-
comes in America are far from equal. Indeed, by the time she is 
finished, Hochschild has adopted Alan Freeman's view that racism 
can be ended only by reverse discrimination, i.e., as she puts it, 
"that blacks be given disproportionate resources, power, and status 
until race would no longer affect people's life chances." In her 
view, "[t]he great risk is that such a massive disruption of normal 
patterns of reward and mobility would reveal the underlying class 
structure, and destroy the belief in equal opportunity that is the 
lynchpin of American society."s That is why she concludes, inexo-
5. J. HOCHSCHILD, supra, at xi. 
6. /d. at 2. 
7. /d. 
8. /d. at 202. 
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rably, according to her logic, that "[i]f whites cannot bring them-
selves to give up the advantages that America's racial and class 
practices give them, they must permit elites to make that choice for 
them."9 So much for democracy. 
Having altered the conventional definition of liberalism from 
equal opportunity to equal results, Hochschild not surprisingly con-
cludes that liberalism is incompatible with racism. She earlier de-
fined racism as contrary to liberalism because "[i]t uses ascriptive 
characteristics, not achieved character, to determine people's fate, 
and it proclaims that some groups should not partake of liberalism's 
promises."w Thus "racism" is now to be remedied by treating the 
majority of the population by their ascriptive characteristics, i.e., by 
denying them equal opportunity. 
This summary treatment of Hochschild's position does not do 
justice to the flair and distinction with which she buttresses her po-
sition. She makes use of a wide variety of data on black-white dif-
ferences. She is aware that the overall position of blacks is 
improving but that by some measures things are getting worse. She 
is dismayed by the evidence that whites think things are getting bet-
ter for blacks and blacks think they are getting worse. Her discus-
sion of the evidence on busing is broad, fair, and persuasive. Even 
when concluding that more drastic busing produces better public 
acceptance and, insofar as may be determined, academic perform-
ance, she provides counterinterpretations of the evidence. 
The strongest part of this book, a book with which all later 
writers will have to contend, is its discussion of the evidence on 
desegregation. Instead of the view that all is peaches and cream or 
that all is rotten, Hochschild makes a good case for the marginally 
positive effects of desegregation. She is also ingenious in trying to 
show that incremental change does not lead to outcomes as good as 
radical change. 
Nevertheless, I find her position, despite its force and verve, 
wanting. It is not so much what Hochschild puts in her admirable 
book but what she leaves out that is troublesome. As a citizen and a 
political scientist, I never (literally, never) think of any matter of 
political importance without asking myself about its consequences 
for race relations. For the future of American democracy may well 
depend on whether and to what extent racial reconciliation takes 
place. Would Hochschild's recommendations, I ask, take us closer 
to or further from that goal? In analyzing that question, I will be-
9. /d. at 203. 
10. /d. at 2. 
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gin with a closer look at her attack on incrementalism, and will then 
consider some broader issues relating to busing. 
I. INCREMENTALISM AND RESISTANCE 
Hochschild uses the doctrine of incrementalism as a metaphor 
for conservative (small, slow, partial) as opposed to radical (large, 
speedy, fundamental) change. Let us consider this doctrine in his-
torical perspective. A famous version of incrementalism, Sir Karl 
Popper's "piecemeal social engineering," was deliberately designed 
as a counterweight to dictatorial political systems whose leaders 
thought they had the knowledge ("scientific socialism") or the intu-
ition ("Meinkampf') to achieve grand objectives without taking 
into account popular preferences. In response, Popper sought to 
outline a far less ambitious approach that would conserve consent 
and understanding. The now-classical formalization of incre-
mentalism is due to Charles E. Lindblom's seminal work.11 In his 
hands, disjointed incrementalism, with its serial, remedial, small-
scale attacks on problems, became a formal rival to synoptic or 
comprehensive decision making. The emphasis was on the use of 
the plural character of interests in society as aids to calculation. 
Instead of being viewed as a defect of democracy, as the unfortunate 
irrationality of the citizenry, Lindblom converted the desirability of 
consent into a positive asset.l2 
At this point it is important to observe what incrementalism 
was not. As Simon put it, decision makers "satisficed" because they 
had not the wit to maximize. When you thought you knew better, 
you tried to do better. In Lindblom's socially oriented approach, 
incrementalism was always a doctrine of the second best. When 
ends were substantially agreed and knowledge of means was strong, 
that was first best. Where those conditions did not obtain, amidst 
the usual doubts about causality and disagreement about objectives, 
incremental methods were appropriate substitutes. 
Although this facet has been insufficiently appreciated, incre-
mentalism was also part of the doctrine of the positive state. Were 
incrementalism designed to justify inaction, the doctrine would 
have stressed the unacceptability, not the desirability, of trying out 
small moves. Given the increasing size and scope of government, 
one possible response to those who argued that intervention was 
interference, because no one knew enough to assure desirable conse-
11. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 Pus. ADMIN. REV., Spring 
1959, at 79; and D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY 
EVALUATION AS A SociAL PROCESS (1963). 
12. C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965). 
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quences, was to say that there was an evolutionary sequence of 
small steps that would enable government to learn (perhaps quite 
rapidly) how to do better. 
As incrementalism changed from a challenge to comprehensive 
means-ends analysis into something like the received wisdom, it be-
came the object of numerous critiques. On the side of calculation, it 
became clear that decision makers might be more dependent on the-
ory-if only to distinguish the effects of one marginal move from 
many others taking place at the same time-than was once 
thought.D In regard to agreement, the pluralist underpinnings of 
incrementalism-all interests would receive adequate representation 
in the political process-came under attack.I4 My impression is 
that as various authors began to doubt the rightness of American 
political life, especially as they felt its institutions were too inegal-
itarian, the acceptability of incrementalism declined. Is 
If we think of conservatism not as an innate psychological dis-
position but as a judgment about how far a system's outcomes are 
from one's own preferences, the charge that incrementalism is con-
servative makes sense. Willingness to accept small departures from 
the status quo does depend on how acceptable the point of depar-
ture is in the first place. For example, today antinuclear and other 
similar groups composed largely of leftistsi6 oppose incremental 
technological change.11 Thus the same sort of people, with similar 
political views, who regard incrementalism in social policies such as 
busing as unconscionably conservative, regard a similar approach to 
technology as murderously radical. 
Incrementalism also has implications regarding public consent. 
In this regard, the difference between voting and busing as civil 
rights measures is illuminating. The legislative provisions in regard 
to voting took a long time amidst repeated struggles to enact. Once 
13. See comments to this effect in A. WtLDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY 
PROCESS xii-xiv (2d ed. 1974). 
14. See the preface to the second edition of R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, Eco-
NOMICS AND WELFARE (1976). 
15. In addition to note II and to J. HOCHSCHILD, see Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not 
Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 517. That the debate over pluralism 
is also essentially a difference over equality may also be seen in the second edition of N. 
POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY (1980). 
16. M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982). 
17. Huber, Exorcists vs. Gatekeepers in Risk Regulation, 7 REG., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 23; 
and Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025 (1983). See 
Pearce, The Preconditions for Achieving Consensus in the Context of Technological Risk, in 
TECHNOLOGICAL RISK: ITS PERCEPTION AND HANDLING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
57 (M. Dierkes, S. Edwards & R. Coppock ed. 1980); Wildavsky, Trial Without Error: Antic-
ipation Versus Resilience as Strategies for Risk Reduction, in REGULATORY REFORM: NEw 
VISION OR OLD CURSE? 200-21 (M. Maxey & R. Kuhn ed. 1985); Goodin, No Moral Nukes, 
90 ETHICS 417 (1980). 
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passed into law, however, the voting provisions were quickly imple-
mented. There may be a tradeoff, therefore, between the slowness 
of legislation, in which disagreements are either resolved or ac-
cepted with resignation, reasonable opportunity to decide otherwise 
having been exhausted, and the speed of implementation. Con-
versely, judge-made laws, quickly enacted, may leave so many ques-
tions unresolved, and so many voices unheard, that they spawn 
endless resistance in the process of implementation. Is 
Hochschild's view is quite the contrary. Her view, briefly, is 
this: What is decisive in school desegregation-what determines 
whether it succeeds or not-is decisiveness itself. Limit the scope of 
desegregation, or leave some aspects of it open to discussion, and 
you buy trouble. For you give opponents a reason to fight, to resist. 
Decide the issue, therefore, unambiguously, authoritatively, once 
and for all-making sure to leave no loopholes. Then people will 
accept desegregation and busing and do the best they can to make it 
work, either because they are (or will shortly become) persuaded 
that busing is desirable, or because they have been persuaded that it 
is inevitable. 
How convincing is this blitzkrieg view of social change? It is 
not implausible at first blush, especially if courts can compel con-
sent. But coordinating a unified national attack on the segregated 
schools would present grave difficulties. It is one thing for one 
judge to pick on a city, like Boston, and take over the local school 
system. It would be quite another to do this on a regional, even a 
national, scale, running across city and suburban (and state?) juris-
dictions as Hochschild wants. 
More generally, whether the courts are up to accomplishing 
desegregation depends in part upon what doing so entails. Desegre-
gation could mean seeing to it that blacks and whites go to school 
together, or at any rate making sure that blacks are not prevented 
from going to school with whites by public officials. But that is not 
really what Hochschild has in mind-certainly, not all that she has 
in mind. School desegregation in her view is a quite open-ended 
objective-to eliminate any practice, or habit of thought, within the 
school disadvantageous to blacks. As Hochschild tells her readers, 
18. A plausible inference from the cases in N. POLSBY, POLITICAL INNOVATION IN 
AMERICA (1984), is that over the medium run slow-moving innovations appear to become 
more legitimate. A partial parallel is provided by the contrast between the lengthy processes 
in which environmental legislation is spawned in Sweden and other European countries com-
pared to the spate of legislation in the United States, and the reversal so far as implementa-
tion is concerned. See the citations in A. Wildavsky, Doing More and Using Less: 
Utilization of Research as a Result of Regime (paper delivered to the Joint Science Center 
Berlin/Stanford University research project and conference on "Cross-National Policy Re-
search," to be published in a conference volume). 
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Full and complete desegregation would call into question parents' rights to send 
their children to private schools, teachers' seniority rights, the sanctity of city /sub-
urb school district lines, and local financing and control of schools, to mention only 
a few sacred cows. Not only poor but also rich whites would have to give up pre-
cious components of their class position for desegregation to be complete. 
Desegregation's indirect attack on the class structure-its revelation of the hol-
lowness of the equal opportunity ideal-is most dangerous to all. A demand for full 
and complete desegregation, and the responses to such a demand, unmask the role 
of schools in perpetuating rather than mitigating the class structure and the struc-
ture itself. Desegregation demands expose unwarranted tracking within schools, 
disparities in resources, expectations, and curriculum between schools, and the 
strong connections among family background, academic achievement, race, and oc-
cupational success. The more blacks focus on results rather than opportunities and 
on institutional biases rather than individual acts, the more the liberal values of 
opportunity and individualism appear fraudulent or at best weak. Once these val-
ues are questioned, the whole social structure is called into question; once that oc-
curs, the class structure becomes visible and therefore a subject of contention.I9 
Guaranteeing equal results from schooling is something, so far as I 
know, that no nation has done. 
And if I am right in this-not right in supposing that things 
must miscarry, only that they may-then the key limitation of 
Hochschild's analysis stands out: She spends scarcely any time 
worrying about what happens if things go wrong. Is it all that obvi-
ous that we could not be worse off, following the policy she ad-
vances? Is it reasonable to suppose, for example, that white 
attitudes toward blacks must continue to improve? Hochschild ar-
gues that racism is built into American society; yet her recommen-
dation makes sense only on the supposition that America has 
goodwill toward blacks, perhaps more so than other societies. So 
much so, in her own view, that Americans are willing to undertake 
in their behalf what no other society has. I see no reason to suppose 
that racial prejudice has had its day, that bigotry cannot make a 
comeback; it has before; it could again. Nor would I have supposed 
that the place of the courts-or more generally, the role of the 
law-was so secure as to require no concern whatever. It may be 
that American institutions seem so stable that instability and its 
consequences for the worst off, who often suffer most, need not be 
taken into account. Or it could be that existing inequalities are con-
sidered so unconscionable that nothing could be worse. Either way, 
political consent is evidently not considered a scarce resource. 
The problem of implementation seems to me severe because I 
think Hochschild, otherwise so acute, has in one critical respect 
quite misunderstood the view of those she calls "anomaly" theo-
rists-above all Myrdal. The anomaly thesis, as I understand it, 
comes to this: Americans have (or had) one set of ideas and convic-
19. J. HOCHSCHILD, supra, at 155-56. 
168 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:161 
tions about liberty and equality and fairness for whites, another for 
blacks. Their views regarding blacks are (or were), literally, anoma-
lous: different from, and at odds with, their views generally; which 
is, of course, the reason for Myrdal's (relative) optimism. But the 
dilemma that interests Hochschild is quite different. The great ob-
stacle from Hochschild's point of view is precisely the source of op-
timism from Myrdal's. For Myrdal supposes that it is only 
necessary for Americans to change their opinions about blacks, 
whereas Hochschild supposes that they must change their basic val-
ues. Where Myrdal's dilemma is one of classification, i.e., whites 
placing blacks in the category where enlightened rules apply, Hoch-
schild wants to change the rules. From Hochschild's point of view, 
the real obstacles are not a set of attitudes brought into play only or 
chiefly on racial issues. Many citizens object to a range of policies 
to assist blacks; but-and this seems an important point-they ob-
ject to such policies whoever they are intended to help. They take 
the same position on policies designed to help women (e.g., compa-
rable worth) or Mexican Americans (e.g., affirmative action). Myr-
dal's dilemma could be resolved in favor of racial equality (as he 
conceived it) because the weight of American values favored resolu-
tion; it is much less obvious that Hochschild's dilemma can be re-
solved in favor of racial equality (as she conceives it) because the 
weight of American values opposes it. Simply put, it asks whites to 
give a kind of assistance to blacks they would oppose even for 
whites. Movement toward equality of condition, as Hochschild pre-
fers, is not at all the same as equality of opportunity or equality 
before the law, which most Americans now support. Starting with 
the older dilemma, when black people were denied equal rights, 
Hochschild has slipped in a dilemma that is real for her and for 
those who share her views but not for most Americans. 
II. WHAT BOX ARE WE IN? 
Incrementalism is intended to deal with situations in which we 
either lack consensus about goals or knowledge about means. Re-
course to a version of the justly renowned Thompson-Tuden matrix, 
relating knowledge to agreement, will tell us that in regard to bus-
ing we not only disagree about what to do but about even which box 
we are in.zo 
20. Thompson & Tuden, Strategies, Structures, and Processes of Organizational Deci· 
sion, in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION 195-216 (J. Thompson ed. 1959). 
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Everyone agrees that we are not in box one, where there is nearly 
total agreement on objectives and nearly complete understanding of 
means. There are those, against whom Hochschild directs her argu-
ment, who say that there is much agreement on the objective of 
improving education through integrated schools but little under-
standing of whether busing is a good way of securing integration 
and whether integration will improve education. They view them-
selves as being in box two, searching for better solutions. Hoch-
schild, however, places them in box three: these whites know how 
to achieve integration and make it serve education but they do not 
want to give up their privileges. Hence they bargain for less oner-
ous forms, such as voluntary busing, limitations to older students, 
busing into white schools, in sum, the very provisions that Hoch-
schild contends weaken its positive educational effects. Recent 
work by Arthur L. Stinchcombe and D. Garth Taylor suggests an-
other explanation for resistance to busing.21 They find that: 
busing attitudes are only weakly related to the traditional, psychological measure of 
racism or prejudice . . . . (N]ational data and our own analyses show the same for 
Boston during the time of the court order. Busing attitudes are, however related to 
people's perceptions that the new costs of integration by busing are inequitably allo-
cated, illegitimately arrived at (illegitimately decided by the courts and the estab-
lishment), and pose personal threats to the personal weil-being and academic 
achievement of one's children. For instance, people's attitudes about what will hap-
pen to test scores predicts very strongly how much opposition they will show to the 
court order.22 
According to Hochschild, "Americans must choose between 
standard, apparently desirable modes of policy choice and enact-
ment, and the goal of eradicating racism. If whites cannot bring 
themselves to give up the advantages that America's racial and class 
practices give them, they must permit elites to make that choice for 
them."23 That last phrase-elites to make choices for Americans-
is a dagger aimed at democracy.24 Before adopting the thesis that 
21. Stinchombe & Taylor, On Democracy and School Integration, in SCHOOL DESEGRE-
GATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 157-86 (W. Stephan & J. Feagin ed. 1980). 
22. !d. at 177. 
23. ]. HOCHSCHILD, supra, at 203. 
24. See Wildavsky, The "Reverse Sequence" in Civil Liberties, 78 Pus. INT. 32 (1985). 
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majorities have to be deprived of the right to effective representation 
in order to facilitate a gain in achievement by minorities, we ought, 
at a minimum, to be pretty well convinced that the remedy, desegre-
gation by busing, will work. Otherwise, public policy will leave 
whites and blacks angry at institutions that do not live up either to 
their procedural or substantive promises. The possible explanation 
I am about to suggest, building on the work of others, is at once 
comforting-differences in ability are not at issue-and despair-
ing-the factor at fault may be much more difficult to change. 
The usual factors in discussion of differences in racial achieve-
ment-racism, social and economic class, educational resources, 
family background, school expectations, language difficulties, prior 
ceilings on jobs, culturally biased organizations-all have a place, 
but they are readily subject to discount in the context of the experi-
ence of different racial and ethnic groups. A recent example that 
will have to stand for many others, because the literature is far too 
extensive to be summarized here, concerns the effects of poor 
health. On average, black children are less healthy than their white 
counterparts. But one of the unhealthiest groups in the country, 
carrying a legacy of disease from Southeast Asia, are the 
Vietnamese. Yet their educational motivation and achievement, de-
spite this evident handicap and despite language and cultural differ-
ences, are considerable, soon placing them above many whites, all 
without evident abandonment of their home culture. 
Let us consider, instead, another variable-time spent in 
school and doing homework. If blacks spend considerably less time 
in school and do less homework, then no one need be surprised that 
they do less well in the measurable attitudes of educational achieve-
ment. And that apparently is exactly the situation. Even blacks 
with higher educational aspirations study a lot less.2s Yet a positive 
25. J. 0GBU, THE NEXT GENERATION: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION IN AN 
URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (1974); Racial Stratification and Education: The Case of Stockton, 
California, 12 ICRD BULL. I (1977); and Schooling in the Inner City, 21 Soc. 75-79 (1983). 
See also J. HANNA, UNDERSTANDING AND COPING WITH DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR IN 
AMERICA: LIKE ME, MEDDLE ME IN A DESEGREGATED SCHOOL (forthcoming); D. HOL-
LAND & M. EISENHART, WOMEN'S PEER GROUPS AND CHOICE OF 'CAREERS (1982); J. 
0GBU, INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN STOCKTON, 
CALIFORNIA, AND GWEMBE, ZAMBIA, (Kroeber Anthropological Papers, No. 63 & 64, 
1984); L. WEIS, BETWEEN Two WoRLDS (1985). There is a crying need for ethnographic 
investigations of contemporary American life. Saying one studies, as part of a self-report, is 
not nearly as reliable as being observed to study by a trained observer who has come to know 
you and your family. (Much the same is true, of course, of faculty time studies.) The excuses 
for absences, for instance, are likely to change radically from the approved reasons in the 
student handbook to more personally relevant reasons when speaking to a knowledgeable and 
unthreatening observer. It may well be that the much-discussed decline in test scores among 
whites would yield to a more refined "time and concentration" study. 
1986] BOOK REVIEW 171 
attitude toward education, manifested by spending more time get-
ting educated, would seem entirely compatible with ethnic and ra-
cial identity and with individual integrity. If schools, parents, and 
peers all reinforced respect for education, one would expect a grad-
ual reduction of black-white differences in achievement within the 
context of improvement for all. Simple, isn't it? Then why doesn't 
it happen? 
When blacks were ready and willing to accept educational inte-
gration, not only in the sense of sitting next to white skins, but of 
accepting similar educational standards, they were denied that op-
portunity. When many whites were willing to sit in the same class-
rooms, provided that educational standards were shared, many 
blacks were no longer willing. The legacy of racism somehow 
turned in on itself. Educational standards, once used to put blacks 
down, had themselves become tainted just as these self-same stan-
dards were about to bring them up. Any white club willing to have 
them, as the great Groucho put it, was not worth joining. If it is not 
any innate individual difference but this acquired cultural difference 
that distinguishes the black experience from that of other ethnic and 
racial groups who share many of the same initial handicaps, the 
American dilemma is bigger than we thought. 
A recent paper by Harry Eckstein raises the right issue. Do 
the groups under consideration want to be treated like others or are 
they deliberately rejecting the mainstream culture, including its 
modes of learning for educational achievement?26 Building on 
Mary Metz's seminal study of schools as moral orders,n Eckstein 
probes the deep implications of self-exclusion. Here, for the pur-
pose of this review essay, it is sufficient to consider the implications 
of self-exclusion for Hochschild's thesis. 
It is hard to see how the promise of American life, that combi-
nation of cultural diversity and material abundance, can be even 
partially fulfilled without both racial integration and educational 
achievement. Certainly, Hochschild's version of our common di-
lemma is that it is not to be solved by giving up one for the other, 
achievement for integration, but by maintaining that these goals are 
(or can be made to be) mutually supportive. In this optimism, she 
reveals her quintessentially American character. But how? 
It is possible that the small positive effects observed from racial 
integration in classrooms occur because of the moral influence in 
favor of achievement. Coercion can bring these students into closer 
26. H. Eckstein, Civil Inclusion and Its Discontents (typescript}. 
27. M. METZ, CLASSROOMS AND CORRIDORS: THE CRISIS OF AUTHORITY IN DESEG· 
REGATED SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1978). 
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proximity; but it can also breed hostility if the value of education is 
in dispute. When it is recognized that the criteria of achievement in 
the larger, white society, criteria that Hochschild accepts, have yet 
to be accepted by many blacks, the limits on coercion become 
apparent. 
Another alternative is suggested by anthropologist John Ogbu: 
[T]he academic performance of Black children can be increased (a) by having Black 
children adopt more serious attitudes toward their schoolwork and (b) by increasing 
their efforts and perseverance at their schoolwork .... 
One prerequisite for finding a "solution" to the "community" dimension of the 
problem of persistent disproportionate academic lag of Black students is to recog-
nize that this aspect of the problem exists. Blacks and similar minorities have gen-
erally expressed a kind of institutional discrimination perspective or "blaming the 
system" perspective .... This needs to be balanced with a recognition that some of 
their own responses to the "institutionalized discrimination" or to the dominant 
Whites' exploitation also contribute to the academic difficulties of Black children. 
From this point of view, my analysis is addressed largely to people in the Black 
community. I believe that given the oppositional theme underlying the problem, 
Black children are more likely to change their attitudes and behaviors if encouraged 
to do so from within the Black community .... 
Current awareness programs for Black students and similar minorities tend to 
emphasize discovering racial and ethnic identities and pride. This is fine but not 
enough. It is not enough to discover who they are or that they have their own racial 
or ethnic culture, especially if that reinforces equating school learning with accul-
turation into White middle-class culture .... 
Blacks and similar castelike minorities tend to have what is essentially an ac-
culturation or assimilation view of schooling. That is, they view schooling as learn-
ing White culture and identity or changing into White culturally and cognitively. 
Given that Blacks maintain oppositional identity ... there is ... ambivalence to-
ward learning in school or "acting White." The dilemma is that the individual 
Black student has to choose between academic success or school success and being 
Black.28 
Around the nation a variety of schools and school districts29 
are implicitly following his advice in setting, monitoring, and en-
forcing high academic standards for all pupils. Tests are taken seri-
ously, not as examples of cultural imperialism. Pupils are held back 
when they don't measure up. Excellence is color blind. It ought to 
work. If not, America faces the prospect of declining performance 
together with ever more bitter struggles over the political allocation 
of material goods. Only a single outcome is certain: The America 
28. J. Ogbu, Understanding Community Forces Affecting Minority Students' Academic 
Effort (prepared for The Achievement Council of California, May 1984, and adapted from 
chapter 1 of CROSSING CULTURE BouNDARIES: RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF HIGH EDU-
CATIONAL ASPIRATIONS AND LoW ScHOOL PERFORMANCE (in preparation)). Richard 
Rodriquez writes beautifully of this dilemma for Mexican Americans in his Hunger of Mem-
ory(1981). 
29. Oakland Tribune, Apr. 7, 1985, and succeeding days, ran a series on such schools. 
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the victors inherit won't be worth having. And that is the most un-
American dilemma I can think of. 
My own sense of the fitness of things (I grew up in Brooklyn 
where, despite calumnies, far more than a single tree grows) is based 
on a city boy's marvel at nature the trickster. Especially at her 
sweetest. On my fence in Oakland I have growing a lush vine, clem-
atis armandii, which, besides producing a bevy of white flowers, is 
suffused with a sweet fragrance. It perfumes the air and is other-
wise a delight. It is also easy to handle. One can snip off segments 
easily with little damage to appearance or odor. Should our vine 
entwine itself around another flower, however, it will keep tighten-
ing itself in such a loving embrace that soon friendly, welcoming, 
luscious clematis chokes the life out of its host. The wise, the adage 
goes, should protect against the damage done by the merely good. 
